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Although	Britain	won’t	rejoin	EFTA,	it	can	learn	a
great	deal	from	its	experience
Although	Theresa	May	wants	a	bespoke	deal	with	the	EU	that	will	be	outside
the	European	Free	Trade	Association,	EFTA’s	own	relationship	with	the
Union	is	instructive,	write	Sieglinde	Gstöhl	(College	of
Europe)	and	Christian	Frommelt	(Liechtenstein	Institute).	It	sheds	light
on	the	challenges	of	an	‘arm’s-length’	relationship	with	the	EU,	in	particular
for	trade	policy.
In	her	Florence	speech	in	September,	Theresa	May	reiterated	the	UK	government’s	desire	to	negotiate	‘a	deep
and	special	partnership’	with	the	European	Union.	This	appears	to	be	located	somewhere	between	a	Canadian-
style	free	trade	agreement	(FTA)	and	membership	of	the	European	Economic	Area	(EEA),	the	EU’s	most	far-
reaching	single	market	association	with	neighbouring	countries.	The	UK	is	not	seeking	an	‘off-the-shelf’	model,
but	wants	to	‘be	creative’	in	designing	a	model	‘which	respects	the	freedoms	and	principles	of	the	EU,	and	the
wishes	of	the	British	people’.
Despite	the	UK’s	desire	for	a	bespoke	deal,	taking	a	closer	look	at	the	European	Free	Trade	Association	(EFTA)
–	of	which	the	UK	was	a	founding	member	in	1960	–	helps	to	assess	the	prospects	of	tariff-free,	frictionless	trade
with	the	EU	and	‘the	greatest	possible	access	to	the	single	market’,	as	May	proclaimed	in	her	Lancaster	House
speech.	The	EEA,	and	to	lesser	extent	also	the	sectoral	bilateral	agreements	between	Switzerland	and	the	EU,
cover	most	of	the	UK’s	interests.	However,	the	experience	of	the	EFTA	states	is	at	odds	with	the	UK
government’s	‘red	lines’	of	conducting	an	independent	British	trade	policy;	containing	immigration	to	Britain	from
Europe;	and	taking	back	control	of	laws	and	the	interpretation	thereof.
EFTA’s	experience	has	four	lessons	for	trade	policy
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EFTA	allows	its	members	to	conduct	an	own	trade	policy	vis-à-vis	third	countries,	but	it	also	offers	the
advantage	of	negotiating	together	in	case	of	common	interests.
All	the	EFTA	states	considered	a	traditional	FTA	with	the	EU	insufficient,	and	they	were	willing	to	align	with
EU	rules	by	concluding	agreements	to	ensure	better	access	to	the	single	market.	In	the	EEA,	the	three
EFTA	states	(Norway,	Iceland	and	Liechtenstein)	adopt	relevant	acquis	on	a	monthly	basis.	Yet	the	practice
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of	‘autonomous	adaptation’	in	Switzerland	shows	that,	due	to	its	high	economic	interdependence	with	the
EU,	the	projection	of	EU	rules	goes	beyond	formal	agreements.	In	addition,	Switzerland’s	agreements	on
civil	aviation	and	in	the	Schengen/Dublin	association	are	based	on	the	EU’s	evolving	acquis.
The	actual	scope	of	the	EU-EFTA	relationship	remains	diffuse,	since	an	EU	act	that	becomes	an	integral
part	of	the	EEA	may	also	cover	policies	that	partly	fall	outside	the	scope	of	the	EFTA	states’	relations	with
the	EU	(for	instance	agriculture	and	fisheries	linked	to	the	free	movement	of	goods).	Moreover,	the	lines
between	the	internal	market	and	other	parts	of	EU	law	(like	fiscal	policy,	citizenship	or	internal	security)
have	become	increasingly	blurred.
Although	the	principle	of	market	homogeneity	enshrined	in	the	EEA	Agreement	guarantees	the	EEA	EFTA
countries	non-discriminatory	access	to	the	single	market,	they	often	take	a	while	to	incorporate	laws,	which
can	affect	their	ability	to	compete.	For	example,	as	the	figure	below	shows,	between	1994	and	2015	only	16
per	cent	of	the	4573	legal	acts	incorporated	into	the	EEA	Agreement	had	the	same	compliance	dates	in	the
31	EEA	countries.	For	all	other	new	legal	acts,	different	sets	of	rules	applied	for	the	citizens	and	businesses
in	the	EU	and	the	EEA	EFTA	states.	This	can	hamper	legal	certainty	and	temporarily	lead	to	competitive
advantages	or	disadvantages.	In	practice,	these	effects	are	often	neglected	given	the	small	size	of	Norway,
Iceland	and	Liechtenstein.	In	the	case	of	the	much	bigger	UK,	however,	different	rules	may	easily	affect	the
smooth	functioning	of	the	EU’s	internal	market.
Share	of	incorporated	EU	acts	with	different	compliance	dates	in	the	EU	and	the	EEA	(1994-2015,	N=4573)
	
What	lessons	can	we	draw	from	EFTA’s	participation	in	the	free
movement	of	people?
Freedom	of	movement	is	part	of	an	overall	balance	of	benefits	and	obligations,	and	emphasises	the
importance	of	non-discrimination.	Full	participation	in	the	single	market	without	free	movement	of	people	is
not	a	realistic	option	for	the	UK.	Furthermore,	the	EU	would	expect	a	financial	contribution	to	reduce
economic	and	social	disparities	in	the	EU	which	is	proportionate	to	the	benefits	that	a	country	draws	from	its
participation	in	the	single	market.
The	actual	scope	of	freedom	of	movement	of	may	differ	slightly	between	the	EU	and	a	case	of	external
differentiation	such	as	the	Swiss	model,	but	would	still	include	the	free	movement	of	workers,	students	and
economically	inactive	people,	the	freedom	of	establishment,	family	reunification,	or	the	coordination	of
social	security	systems.
Liechtenstein’s	special	arrangement	in	this	area	is	closely	linked	to	its	very	small	territory	and	unusually
high	share	of	foreigners,	and	is	therefore	not	a	precedent	for	the	UK	to	follow.
What	are	EFTA’s	lessons	for	the	institutional	architecture	of	the	UK’s
future	relationship	with	the	EU?
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The	‘Interlaken	principles’	which	the	EU	set	out	in	the	late	1980s	are	still	valid:	priority	has	to	be	given	to	the
deepening	of	the	EU’s	own	integration	and	the	preservation	of	its	decision-making	autonomy.	The	EEA
Agreement	grants	EEA	EFTA	states	only	a	limited	participation	in	the	so-called	‘decision-shaping’	phase	of
EU	policy-making,	which	is	more	about	gathering	information	than	exerting	political	influence.
The	EU	insists	on	a	balance	of	benefits	and	obligations	in	each	partnership	and	is	afraid	of	setting	any
precedents	that	could	trigger	more	demands	from	other	non-members.
The	EEA	would	still	require	full	free	movement	of	persons	and	come	with	the	jurisdiction	of	the	EFTA	Court.
Any	close	economic	association	with	the	EU	based	on	its	acquis	requires	a	satisfactory	mechanism	through
which	the	third	countries	keep	up	with	the	evolution	of	the	acquis	in	order	to	safeguard	market	homogeneity.
There	is	an	inherent	trade-off	between	the	benefits	resulting	from	the	single	market	and	the	lack	of
participation	in	the	law-making	process,	which	also	leaves	little	room	for	parliamentary	control.
As	we	describe	above	and	in	our	longer	article,	even	the	highly	institutionalised	EEA	suffers	from
shortcomings,	such	as	an	inconsistent	selection	and	a	delayed	incorporation	of	new	law.
These	lessons	confirm	the	principles	set	out	in	the	EU	guidelines	for	the	Brexit	negotiations:	the	integrity	of	the
single	market	with	its	four	freedoms	and	the	autonomy	of	the	EU’s	legal	order	and	decision-making	process.	The
UK	is	well	aware	of	these	principles,	but	hopes	that	its	unprecedented	point	of	departure	as	an	EU	member	may
provide	the	basis	of	a	bespoke	model.	However,	the	experience	of	the	EFTA	states	shows	that	the	real	challenge
of	European	integration	is	not	to	converge	with	EU	law	but	to	prevent	a	growing	divergence.	In	this	regard,	the
institutional	set-up	of	external	differentiation	is	a	necessary	but	not	sufficient	condition	of	effectiveness.
Specific	characteristics	of	the	EEA	EFTA	states,	such	as	their	small	size,	strong	economic	interdependence	with
the	EU	and	high	state	capacity,	are	likely	to	mitigate	the	constraints	resulting	from	the	institutional	complexity	of
the	EEA’s	two-pillar	structure.	Yet	the	fact	that	the	speed	of	incorporation	differs	greatly	across	EU	acts	shows
that	specific	properties	of	the	acquis	may	also	delay	incorporation.	For	instance,	an	EU	act	may	bestow	the
competence	to	take	binding	decisions	on	an	EU	agency.	Before	such	an	EU	act	can	then	be	incorporated	into	the
EEA	Agreement,	it	first	has	to	be	decided	which	institution(s)	will	be	competent	for	the	EEA	EFTA	states,	and
specific	adaptations	to	the	act	have	to	be	agreed.	Indeed,	for	every	relevant	EU	act,	an	assessment	of	its
compatibility	with	the	EEA’s	institutional	framework	has	to	be	carried	out	as	well	as	an	assessment	of	the
compatibility	of	any	specific	EEA	adaptation	with	the	goals	and	obligations	set	out	in	the	EEA	Agreement.
The	future	partnership	papers	published	by	the	UK	government	so	far	suggest	that,	for	issues	such	as	customs	or
data	protection,	it	intends	to	operate	a	regime	that	aligns	closely	with	the	respective	EU	acquis.	However,	the
papers	still	lack	details	about	the	institutional	framework	for	alignment,	enforcement	and	dispute	resolution.	If	the
UK	were	to	insist	on	its	three	‘red	lines’,	a	‘hard’	Brexit	in	the	form	of	a	limited,	FTA-based	model	would	be	the
logical	result.
Membership	restricted	to	EFTA	only	–	either	full	or	via	an	association	–	would	meet	all	three	British	‘red	lines’,	but
unlike	the	other	EFTA	countries	Britain	would	have	no	access	to	the	EU’s	single	market.	The	UK	would	still	have
to	negotiate	its	future	relationship	with	the	EU.	Consequently,	EFTA	membership	or	association	alone	would	be	of
limited	value	to	the	UK.	Even	if	the	UK	government	does	not	seek	an	‘off-the-shelf’	model	of	the	kind	already
enjoyed	by	other	countries,	but	a	unique	British	one,	it	cannot	escape	the	lessons	to	be	learned	from	EFTA	as	it
negotiates	‘a	deep	and	special	partnership’	with	the	European	Union.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Sieglinde	Gstöhl	is	Professor	of	EU	International	Relations	and	Diplomacy	Studies	at	the	College	of	Europe,
Bruges.
Christian	Frommelt	is	Research	Fellow	in	Politics	at	the	Liechtenstein	Institute,	Bendern.
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